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Abstract
The concept of soft power has been highly influential in recent years, both as a concept to inform 
understanding of the cultural dimensions of international relations and as providing a practical 
guide to state investment in the international expansion of both news and entertainment media. 
One of the places where it has been most influential has been China, where is has been used 
to support the international expansion of China Central Television and the growth of Chinese 
entertainment media conglomerates. It is argued in this article, however, that the concept rests 
upon a weak understanding of the cultural dimensions of power and upon the transmission 
model of communication. As a result, there has tended to be a distributional bias in investing in 
cultural diplomacy and relatively little attention has been given to how audiences actually engage 
with international media content. Applied to the Chinese case, it is argued that support for 
entertainment media is more likely to support the aspirations of the Chinese government than 
news media, although news is likely to be prioritized for political reasons. At a more conceptual 
level, discussion of national soft power strategies and their relation to global media points to the 
need for new approaches in global media and communication studies, that could be termed post-
globalization, that can address strengths and weaknesses in both critical political economy and 
media globalization approaches, and recognize the continuing centrality of nation states to the 
structuring of global media flows across territorial boundaries.
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2 Global Media and China 
Soft power—proliferating uses and confusing definitions
One of the features of recent debates surrounding soft power and cultural diplomacy is that, as use 
of the term “soft power” has increased, there has been a blurring of specifics surrounding the defi-
nition of the term. The most influential definition of soft power remains that proposed by the 
Harvard University International Relations Theorist Joseph S Nye, which defined soft power as 
“the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004, 
p. x) and the associated “ability to shape the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). In his earliest 
book addressing the topic, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, published in 
1990, Nye sought to distinguish the command power associated with economic and military power 
from the co-optive or “soft” power of “setting the agenda and determining the framework of a 
debate” (Nye, 1990, p. 32). Nye (2011, p. 84) has argued that the soft power of a country rests upon 
three pillars:
1. Culture (in places where it is attractive to others);
2. Political values (when these live up to them at home and abroad);
3. Foreign policies (when others see these as legitimate and having moral authority).
The parentheses that surround each of these terms are important, since they indicate the rela-
tional dimension of each concept. They are the conditions which determine “whether potential soft 
power resources translate into the behavior of attraction that can influence others toward favorable 
outcomes” (Nye, 2011, p. 84); Nye (2011) emphasizes that “with soft power, what the target thinks 
is particularly important, and the targets matter as much as the agents. Attraction and persuasion 
are socially constructed. Soft power is a dance that requires partners” (p. 84).
Nye originally intended the concept of soft power for an elite American audience, particularly 
key US foreign policy decision-makers. In particular, Bound to Lead was intended as a response to 
pessimistic accounts of the future of US’ power in the world, such as Paul Kennedy’s (1990) The 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. An important factor behind the subsequent growth has been the 
take-up of the concept in the People’s Republic of China, to be discussed in more detail below. But 
the term also entered into a more popular vernacular. There can be little doubt about the take-up of 
the term. Using Google nGram, we can see that there was a period of steady growth in the circula-
tion of the term between 1990 and 2000 and then a take-off in the term’s use after 2000, with the 
term appearing in six times as many publications in 2008 as it did in 2000 (Figure 1).
While the discussion in the 1990s was largely one emanating from within the United States and 
the international relations circles with which Nye was primarily associated, the concept took off 
globally in the 2000s and was increasingly being used across a range of academic disciplines. In 
communication studies, Daya Thussu’s (2010) International Communication: A Reader included 
an excerpt from Nye on soft power, while authors such as Colin Sparks critically assessed the 
theory of soft power and its relationship to cultural imperialism (Sparks, 2012) and international 
broadcasting (Sparks, 2016). A recent special issue of the International Journal of Cultural Policy, 
edited by Ien Ang, Raj Isar, and Philip Mar (2015), has sought to apply a cultural studies perspec-
tive to debates around cultural diplomacy, drawing upon prior contributions from cultural studies 
such as Iwabuchi (2002) and Clarke (2014), among others.
But the main place where discussion of soft power has taken off has been China. The official 
discourses will be discussed below, but there are many other indicators of the extent to which soft 
power has become an important topic of academic debate, reflective of China’s commitment to 
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advancing its cultural soft power globally. Xie (2015) found that a search on China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI)—the world’s largest digital collection of Chinese language jour-
nal articles—for articles with “soft power” in the title generated 1777 entries since 2000. She also 
observed that there were up to 50 university centers and government think tanks in China devoted 
to the study of public diplomacy and soft power, most of which had been established after 2000.
Soft power has also become an important topic for popular literature as well as various indica-
tors developed by think tanks. The Institute for Government prepared a Soft Power Index in 2010 
that ranked 26 nations across six categories of soft power and 27 performance indicators (McClory, 
2011). The performance metrics used included the following:
1. Culture. The level of inbound tourism, international reach of state-sponsored media, num-
ber of foreign correspondents in the country, international use of national language, and 
number of winter and summer Olympic gold medals;
2. Diplomacy. Foreign aid as the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the number of 
languages spoken by the head of government, strictness of visa requirements, ranking of 
the national “brand,” and the number of dedicated cultural missions abroad;
3. Government. Position on the United Nations (UN) Human Development index, position on 
the World Bank Good Governance index, position on the Freedom House index of political 
freedom and liberty, measures of trust in the government, and measures of personal life 
satisfaction;
4. Education. The number of universities in The Times Higher Education top 200, the number 
of foreign students studying at a nation’s universities, and the number of “think tanks” in a 
country;
5. Business/innovation. The number of international patents as a percentage of GDP, business 
competitiveness as measured by the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
index, the level of corruption as measured by Transparency International, innovation index 
Figure 1. Uses of the term “Soft Power” on Google nGram.
Source: Google nGram (2015).
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as measured by the Boston Consulting Group, and foreign investment as a percentage of 
total capital investment;
6. Subjective measures. The quality of high and popular cultural outputs, the quality of 
national food and drink, relative international appeal of national celebrities, the perceived 
quality of the national airline, the reputation of a nation’s embassies, and the perceived 
global effectiveness of its national head of government.
This is a very expansive set of metrics to attempt to measure a nation’s relative soft power. It 
also tends to favor long-established European powers. In the Institute for Government’s Soft Power 
Index, the United Kingdom and France tie for first rank, followed by the United States, Germany, 
and Switzerland. China is ranked #17, India #23, and Russia #26 (Figure 2).
The notable feature of such lists is partly who features at the top—primarily European nations, 
particularly the United Kingdom—and also who features at the bottom. In particular, the method-
ologies used seem to place China in an unusually low position vis-à-vis not only major countries 
but also ones with less apparent claims to international influence. The index developed by the 
London-based public relations firm Portland Communication in collaboration with Facebook 
(“Power: Softly Does It,” 2015) is even more notable in this regard (Figure 3). This soft power 
index found the United Kingdom at the top, followed by Germany, the United States, and France; 
incredibly, China is at the bottom of the list of 30 countries, below Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, 
Greece, the Czech Republic, Turkey, and Mexico.
In a recent overview of the relationship of soft power to cultural policy, Ang et al. (2015) 
observe that a lack of clarity around uses of the term arise in part out of how cultural diplomacy as 
an intentionally driven governmental practice in other parts of the world is conflated with cultural 
relations, “which tend to be driven by ideals rather than interests and … practiced largely by non-
state actors” (p. 365). The relationship between state and non-state actors is one source of potential 
conceptual confusion surrounding the term. The Institute for Government Soft Power Index dis-
cussed above blurs measures that are clearly the result of decisions made by national governments 
(e.g. level of foreign aid and number of international cultural missions) with those that the govern-
ment itself has little bearing upon (e.g. appeal of celebrities and perceived quality of national food 
Figure 2. Rankings from the Institute for Government’s Soft Power Index, 2010.
Source: McClory (2011, p. 20).
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and drink). If we focus upon the specifically cultural dimensions of soft power, we also find other 
important distinctions that were needed to be made. Does a nation derive international cultural 
influence from its news and information-based media, for instance, or its entertainment media? Are 
its cultural outputs primarily the product of commercially based media and creative industries, or 
is there a central role played by the government in promoting cultural exports? Is a nation best 
known for its “high” culture or its popular culture? And how do we know whether there is influ-
ence deriving from such cultural artifacts, let alone anything equating to power? Nye (2011) has 
Figure 3. Rankings from Portland/Facebook Soft Power Index, 2015. 
Source: “Power: Softly Does It” (2015).
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himself referred to how “wide usage has sometimes meant misuse of the concept as a synonym for 
anything other than military force” (p. 81).
Soft power debates in China
There is little doubt that the place where Joseph Nye’s soft power thesis has come to have its 
greatest influence is China. The Chinese scholar Wang Huning, who served as Deputy Director 
of the Policy Research Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) under Jiang Zemin and 
was appointed to the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee under Hu Jintao, wrote in 1993 
that “if a country has an admirable culture and ideological system, other countries will tend to 
follow it … It does not have to use its hard power which is expensive and less efficient” (quoted 
in Glaser & Murphy, 2009, p. 12). The importance of cultural soft power was flagged in various 
speeches by Hu Jintao, such as his address to a joint session of the Australian Federal Parliament, 
where he observed that “the Chinese culture belongs not only to the Chinese but to the whole 
world” (Hu, 2003). At the same time, Hu also expressed concern that “the overall strength of 
China’s culture and its international influence is not commensurate with China’s international 
status” (quoted in Keane & Zhao, 2014, p. 167). Soft power has also been important under Xi 
Jinping’s leadership. In a December 2014 speech titled “Enhance China’s Cultural Soft Power,” 
Xi (2014) proposed that
To strengthen our cultural soft power, we should disseminate the values of modern China … More work 
should be done to refine and explain our ideas, and extend the platform for overseas publicity, so as to 
make our culture known through international communication and dissemination. (p. 179)
Soft power initiatives are important elements of a nation’s public diplomacy, or how a nation 
engages and communicates with foreign publics and thus promoting of national interests in inter-
national arenas; Cull (2008, pp. 32–35) has divided the practice of public diplomacy into the fol-
lowing five elements:
1. Listening. Collecting information on international opinions, whether by legal or covert 
means that is spying and intelligence gathering;
2. Advocacy. Promoting particular policies, ideas or interests to foreign publics, typically 
through one’s own embassies in other countries;
3. Cultural diplomacy. Promoting a nation’s cultural resources overseas and/or facilitating 
cultural transmission abroad;
4. Exchange diplomacy. Promoting reciprocal exchanges of people with other nations, for 
example, as students;
5. International broadcasting. The use of news bureaus, radio and television broadcasting, 
and Internet communication to engage with foreign publics.
If we put aside spying and intelligence gathering, we can identify a number of areas where 
China has been active across all of these aspects of public diplomacy in recent years including the 
following:
•• Hosting major international events such as the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai 
World Expo in 2010;
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•• Promoting international graduate student and researcher exchanges through the China 
Scholarships Council and other educational initiatives;
•• Investing in the international expansion of Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese language 
and culture (Flew & Hartig, 2014);
•• Developing foreign language services for China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio 
International CRI), and the Xinhua News Agency as well as investing in the international 
expansion of these services (Gorfinkel, Joffe, van Staden, & Wu, 2014; Huang, 2012; Xin, 
2012);
•• Promotion of co-production arrangements in entertainment media such as films, TV pro-
grams, and online games; to capture expertise from other parts of the world; and gain better 
access to international markets.
Soft power has acquired influence in China in part because it proposes a strategy for expand-
ing international influence without the application of military force. It is consistent with the 
aspirations of Chinese leaders since 2003 to promote China’s “peaceful rise” or “peaceful 
development” to Great Power status, and thus neutralize the “China threat” discourse that exists 
elsewhere in the world (Hartig, 2015, pp. 21–23). It is also consistent with ancient Chinese 
teachings such as Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, particularly the notion that “Subjugating the ene-
my’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence” (Sawyer & Sawyer, 1993, p. 
161). Glaser and Murphy (2009) observed that soft power initiatives in China are primarily 
seen as cultural in their orientation and sit alongside political, diplomatic, and military activi-
ties rather than being subsumed within them (pp. 10–14). From this perspective, the strategy of 
“going global” that has been pursued for Chinese media and cultural institutions since 2006 
looks not only to enhance Chinese soft power internationally but also to reverse the cultural 
trade deficit that China faces internationally, by bolstering exports in its media, cultural, and 
creative industries.
China’s approach to public diplomacy is relatively distinct in several key respects. International 
broadcasting has a particular importance in its cultural diplomacy strategies, with CCTV 
International finding itself at the heart of strategies to use public diplomacy to improve the 
image of China internationally. Gary Rawnsley (2015) has noted that “with communications … 
right at the heart of China’s policy-making machinery (an achievement matched by few states), 
broadcasters were instructed to be more proactive in their conduct of public diplomacy on behalf 
of the nation and its international interests” (p. 277). Yet there are difficulties for China in accru-
ing prestige in international broadcasting, as CCTV is clearly embedded in the heart of the 
Chinese party-state, and the prestige that accrues to an entity such as the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) for being government-funded yet structurally independent from the British 
state does not come to CCTV.
There is also the important distinction that exists in China between news and information media 
on one hand and entertainment media and the creative industries, on the other. Entertainment is 
much more open to private capital investment than news, and in the context of China’s strategy of 
“going out” (zou chüqù), there are much greater opportunities for Chinese direct investment in 
overseas entertainment media, the involvement of foreign media companies in producing enter-
tainment media content in China, and co-production arrangements. I will argue that the field of 
media and communications, as well as cultural studies, has a great deal to contribute to contempo-
rary debates about the role of entertainment media in Chinese strategies to enhance international 
influence and build cultural soft power.
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From soft power to cultural power: restating the communication 
dimensions of cultural diplomacy
Soft power is thus linked to cultural diplomacy. Cull (2008) has defined cultural diplomacy as a 
subset of public diplomacy, which involves “an actor’s attempt to manage the international envi-
ronment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitat-
ing cultural transmission abroad … cultural diplomacy has meant a country’s policy to facilitate 
the export of examples of its culture” (p. 33). Otmazgin (2007) has observed that in relation to soft 
power as an international relations strategy, “culture is seen as a means of public relations and a 
method of strengthening a country’s influence” (p. 76). Holden (2013) argues that there are a “hier-
archy of strategic aims” around cultural diplomacy and soft power, that range from increasing 
familiarity and awareness of a county to creating positive perceptions and encouraging further 
engagement (e.g. tourism, study abroad, and buying its products) to influencing people’s behavior 
and “getting companies to invest, encouraging public support for your country’s positions and 
convincing politicians to turn to it as an ally” (Holden, 2013, p. 22).
At the same time, there exists considerable conceptual confusion around the cultural dimen-
sions of soft power and particularly around how these cultural dimensions are defined and under-
stood. It is typically seen as an adjunct to public diplomacy and the acquisition of power by 
non-military means—which entails a very broad definition of the term “soft,” along the lines of 
using the concept as “a synonym for anything other than military force” (Nye, 2011, p. 81)—or as 
a conduit for behavioral influence and attitudinal change. From the perspectives of communica-
tions and cultural studies, the way that “culture” is being used in these discourses of soft power and 
cultural diplomacy sounds similar to what is known as the transmission model of communication, 
where “the communication of these images, ideas and values, packaged in distinct cultural prod-
ucts, is a linear, one-way process, in which the receiving end (i.e. the target foreign audience) 
simply absorbs the messages contained in these products” (Ang et al., 2015, p. 374).
Not surprisingly, what can be found to be missing from transmission-based accounts is consid-
eration of reception, or the processes through which audiences derive meaning and pleasure from 
such cultural forms, particularly when such relationships are viewed in a transnational and cross-
cultural perspective. There thus tends to be a distributional bias in research on media and soft 
power, where evidence of reach is taken to be synonymous with influence. For instance, the propo-
sition that CCTV claims to cover “98 per cent of the world … with 45 million subscribers outside 
China” (cited in Zhang, 2011, p. 63) is a nebulous figure, since it tells us nothing about the compo-
sition of that audience or how regularly they engage with the site. Indeed, Zhang’s (2011) survey, 
undertaken in 2009, found that the majority of online users of the CCTV-9 site (as CCTV 
International was previously known) were Chinese themselves, with 43% being Chinese who 
accessed the site from within China.
Culture is also being understood in terms of its products or artifacts, as “a thing … consisting of 
content—images, ideas and values—that is readily presentable” (Ang et al., 2015, p. 374). This rein-
forces the tendency to view the transmission of such cultural forms into other countries as an end in 
itself, with far less attention being given to questions of engagement with these cultural forms in other 
countries. There is also the confusing question of whether any of this distributional activity is generat-
ing changes in power. Insofar as a concept of power is explicitly articulated in soft power debates, it 
is typically understood in relational and behavioral terms: the ability of actor A to influence the 
behavior of actor B (Lukes, 2005). The structural dimensions of power or the “power to decide how 
things shall be done [and] the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, 
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relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises” (Strange, 1994, pp. 24–25) and the relationship of 
media as a cultural institution to such power relations are only implicitly considered.
The other question about power that hangs over the soft power discourse, from a communica-
tions perspective, is the extent to which power resides with producers, distributors, or audiences. 
Clarke (2014) has proposed that
There are four categories of actor who can be regarded as making meaning with cultural products in this 
context, and who can therefore be described both as cultural producers and cultural consumers: namely, 
policy-makers themselves; institutions and individuals charged with implementing cultural diplomacy 
policy … cultural practitioners; and, finally, individuals engaging with cultural products which are 
produced for or used in cultural diplomacy. (p. 8)
Rawnsley (2015) has also observed that
there is no guarantee that the audience for international programming will decode the meaning of messages 
in a way the source would prefer, since interpretation occurs according to the prevailing cultural, social 
and political beliefs, attitudes and norms among individual audience members. (p. 280)
In communications and cultural studies, what emerges is what is known as the active audience 
debate or the extent to which dominant messages are successfully encoded by their senders and 
influence receiver behavior in desired ways or where the audience as decoders have interpretative 
power over such messages, choosing how to generate meaning and preferred readings of these 
messages. Gibson (2007) has observed that, from its beginnings in 1960s Britain,
the field of Cultural Studies has perpetually oscillated between an emphasis on “power” in terms of the 
imposition of ideology through culture, on the one hand, and “agency” in terms of the relatively freedom 
of the consumer, on the other. (p. 167)
These tensions and contradictions take even stronger forms in the age of digital networks and 
social media, as users are content producers as well as consumers, and can actively share interpre-
tations of mainstream media messages through multiple online fora.
The closest analogy to theories of soft power in global communications has been theories of 
media and cultural imperialism. As developed by Herbert Schiller (1976, 1991), Oliver Boyd-
Barrett (2014), and many others, cultural imperialism was defined as
the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating 
stratum is attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond 
to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating centre of the system. (Schiller, 1976, p. 9)
The parallels between Nye’s concept of soft power and Schiller’s conception of cultural imperial-
ism are striking, particularly in the manner in which they identify exposure to another country’s 
media content as serving to shape the values, beliefs, and ideas of people in the recipient culture. 
The critical difference is that whereas Nye identifies exposure to American culture as a positive 
influence in world affairs, Schiller and others view it negatively, as a force that mitigates against 
more organic and locally based notions of cultural sovereignty.
There is also a lack of clarity around governmental and popular dimensions of soft power. There 
is a conflation of cultural diplomacy, or intentionally driven governmental practice in other parts 
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of the world, with cultural relations, “which tend to be driven by ideals rather than interests and … 
practiced largely by non-state actors” (Ang et al., 2015, p. 365). Hollywood’s global success 
derives from the perceived distance of its cultural products from the US government; but cultural 
diplomacy initiatives typically rely upon the government for funding and patronage, as seen, for 
example, with the proliferation of state-sponsored international broadcasting services in recent 
years (Sparks, 2016). Similarly, the international influence of the BBC as an international broad-
caster derives from its combination of being government-funded—and hence not dependent upon 
corporate advertising and sponsorship—but perceived to be independent of the British government 
of the day. The differing relationships between the state and civil society organizations between 
nation states is one of the important areas of distinction in comparative studies of soft power and 
cultural diplomacy.
In order to better comprehend the issues that such strategies are raising and ground them in 
perspectives influences by communication and cultural studies, I would argue the need to let go of 
the term “soft power” and think instead about cultural power. By referring to cultural power rather 
than soft power, the specificity of the cultural dimensions of public and cultural diplomacy strate-
gies can be better understood, as well as their relationship to political and economic power, rather 
than using “soft power” as a catch-all category for a largely undifferentiated set of non-military 
approaches to acquiring international influence, from student scholarships to international broad-
casting. It connects the concept to wider debates around the relationship of culture to government 
(Bennett, 1998; Yùdice, 2003); nation branding and the projection of national cultures globally 
(Kornberger, 2010; Mihelj, 2011); and the struggle for competitive advantage for national, cultural, 
and creative industries in the global creative economy (Flew, 2012; Lee & Lim, 2014).
It also draws out more clearly what we may mean by power in such frameworks. Insofar as the 
exercise of cultural power refers to the capacity to influence the thinking and thus the behavior of 
others, whether around matters of cultural consumption or international alliances, it opens up the 
capacity to think in terms of relational power, rather than simply thinking in terms of the distribu-
tion of content around the world. As soft power ultimately derives from a communications frame-
work, it also enables analysis to take questions of transnational communication flows and 
cross-cultural reception more seriously and to better apprehend the limits of cultural power as it is 
exercised through cultural diplomacy strategies such as those involving global media.
Cultural power and public diplomacy: some international 
comparisons
The critical question for strategies of soft power and cultural diplomacy, as they sit within a suite 
of wider public diplomacy initiatives, is how they straddle the relationship between traditional 
government-to-government diplomacy and the plethora of cross-national and cross-cultural 
exchanges that occur between people using popular media. They point to a role for the government 
acting not only as a patron in order to initiate such communications flows, but distancing itself 
from the production and reception of media messages themselves. In the case of Hollywood film 
and television industry, the perceived desire to entertain mass audiences by avoiding overt political 
messaging is a part of the global appeal of such content, even if one finds considerable links 
between the big US entertainment conglomerates and government agencies such as the US State 
Department and the US Department of Commerce if one digs not far below the surface (Miller, 
Govil, McMurria, Maxwell, & Wang, 2005). With the BBC, another globally admired flagship of 
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soft power through international broadcasting, the hard-won structural independence of the BBC 
from the UK government has earned it a strong reputation as an exemplar of public service media 
and a beacon of independent journalism, even if, again, closer observers of the BBC in practice 
would detect constant political influences swirling around its strategic orientation and its day-to-
day strategies (Steemers, 2016).
A simple way of viewing these two cases would be to see the United States as occupying the 
“entertainment” and “commercial” strand of cultural power, and the United Kingdom the “infor-
mation” and “state-led” strand, based on the cases of Global Hollywood and BBC World. But this 
would be misleading in understanding the cultural influence of both nations. The United Kingdom 
is as famous for its entertainment media as its news and information media and for its commercial 
popular culture as much as its state-sponsored “high” culture: James Bond, Harry Potter, One 
Direction, Adele, the English Premier League, and Top Gear are all inextricably parts of the British 
cultural “brand” as it is projected to the rest of the world. The BBC straddles the high/popular 
culture divide in interesting ways: on a global scale, it may be BBC World, leading documentaries, 
and investigative journalism; but it is also the home of Strictly Come Dancing, Doctor Who, and 
Top Gear.
In the case of the United States, its news outlets remain global leaders—even if, as Tunstall 
(2008) has argued, their ascendancy was shaken considerably by the experience of how they mis-
reported the Iraq War—and the United States has a central place in the arts, drama, dance, and 
theater, as well as the prestige attached to its museums, galleries, and libraries. Moreover, like the 
United Kingdom, its most prestigious educational institutions trade on values of history, tradition, 
and the dissemination over time of “high” cultural values that have great appeal to globally mobile 
higher education students from around the world (Marginson, 2013).
Both the United States and the United Kingdom present problematic exemplars for China in 
developing cultural power strategies. The wave of co-productions that Chinese film companies are 
now engaging in with the major Hollywood producers point to important strategic alliances being 
formed, where China is able to capture the technical know-how and tacit knowledge of audience 
desires that exists in the world’s most powerful screen-based industries, in exchange for capital 
investment and privileged access to the large Chinese domestic market. But the risk on the Chinese 
side is that what results are generic global blockbusters such as Fast & Furious 7, which generate 
global box office revenues and enhance the economic standing of Chinese media and creative 
industries do little to advance aspirations to make Chinese culture better known to the world 
through global media. In the field of global news and information, CCTV is available in many parts 
of the world and in multiple languages, but struggles to get significant audience reach even among 
the Chinese diaspora, due in part to the difficulties it faces in establishing its structural independ-
ence from the government when contrasted to the leaders in international news broadcasting such 
as the BBC and CNN.
Two very different case studies in cultural diplomacy and global media are Russia and India, 
which arguably occupy two ends of the spectrum between state-led and information-based approaches 
and commercially driven and entertainment-based ones. The state-funded Russia Today (RT) TV 
network, which was established in 2005 with content directed to audiences outside the Russian 
Federation, has gained a surprising degree of international reach and influence relative to its size. It 
has done so by being explicitly positioned as an alternative to news services such as CNN and the 
BBC, offering what it describes as a “Russian perspective” on global events. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin described the function of RT as being to “try to break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on 
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the global information streams,” observing that “the channel is funded by the government, so it can-
not help but reflect the Russian government’s official position on the events in our country and in the 
rest of the world one way or another” (Fisher, 2013). In 2014, RT has 21 bureaux in 16 nations and it 
has acquired a distinctive niche in international news broadcasting, particularly as an outlet where 
various alleged Western conspiracies can reliably receive a hearing and with a small but significant 
audience in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, among those who view such 
conspiracies as either true or at least warranting a discussion (Rawnsley, 2015).
If Russia represents one end of the soft power spectrum in relation to international media, then 
India provides perhaps the sharpest point of contrast. While there is some coverage of international 
events on Indian private 24-hour news channels, its primary state broadcaster, Doordarshan, is 
largely unavailable outside of India. By contrast, Indian entertainment media have rapidly expanded 
its global reach and “Bollywood” has become one of the world’s leading centers of film production 
and global popular culture. The proliferation of satellite TV channels in India after 1990 greatly 
expanded the domestic market for Indian popular films and these films have also established strong 
popularity not only among the large South Asian diaspora worldwide, but in regions such as Africa 
and the Middle East. A key factor in the regional success of Bollywood cinema is its promotion of 
family and community-oriented values, which are seen as relatively “safe” among Muslim audi-
ences in the Middle East and South Asia, when compared to Hollywood cinema (Thussu, 2014).
The two nations that most directly influence China’s decision-makers in their thinking about 
cultural soft power strategies are Japan and South Korea. Japan was the leader in Asia in promoting 
a distinctive national identity in the Asian region through its commercial popular cultural products 
(Iwabuchi, 2015). From the 1970s onwards, there was a focus on cultural diplomacy initiatives that 
could soften anti-Japanese sentiment and promote better international understanding of Japan 
through cultural exchange. While educational exchange programs and traditional culture were 
components of this cultural diplomacy, the growing international popularity of Japanese films, TV 
shows, animation, and popular music gave an important impetus to such initiatives, particularly in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The 1990s were perhaps the high points of Japanese popular cultural influ-
ence in the Asian region, as anime (animated films), manga (comic books or graphic novels), and 
video games associated with Sony and Nintendo became global cultural phenomena. Japanese 
popular culture became a central part of the identity of the fast-growing Asian middle-class youth 
culture (Chua, 2012; Iwabuchi, 2002).
The 2000s saw new initiatives to promote Japanese culture, around the concepts of “Cool 
Japan,” “Gross National Cool,” and “pop culture diplomacy,” which “sought to capitalize on the 
popularity of Japanese media culture in global markets … and promote the rise of Japan as a global 
cultural superpower” (Iwabuchi, 2015, p. 422; c.f. Yasumoto, 2014). But the Japanese case pos-
sesses some distinctive structural weaknesses when compared with other East Asian nations. One 
is a historic underinvestment in the arts and culture by governments, who have often seen the arts 
and culture as either primarily market-driven, investing public funds in cultural heritage rather than 
in contemporary forms of cultural production (Kawashima, 2014; Kobayashi, 2014). Moreover, 
there continue to be difficulties in accessing the Chinese market, as historical anti-Japanese senti-
ment is overlaid upon contemporary geo-political tensions, such as control over the islands of the 
South China Sea.
South Korea is in many respects the most influential model for cultural power and cultural 
diplomacy in the Asian region, and particularly in China. The popularity of Korean films, TV dra-
mas, video games, and popular music has been referred to as the “Korean Wave” (hallyu), facili-
tated by the preparedness of governments to approach cultural development as a form of industry 
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policy, the commitment to high-speed broadband infrastructure, and the promotion of cultural 
exports. The establishment of the Korean Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) in 2008 has pro-
moted investment in Korean cultural and creative industries and intensified commitments to pro-
moting “Brand Korea” globally. (Hong, 2014).
In terms of its own cultural power strategies, as noted earlier, China has invested heavily in inter-
national expansion in both news and information media and entertainment media. Its “soft power” 
strategies aim to enhance Chinese influence and the standing of China in both the major media 
markets of North America and Europe and in the developing world. It has done so with a perception 
that China’s image is a strategically important component of the country’s continued modernization, 
and an awareness that its relative lack of presence in global media content flows contributes to a 
negative perception of china internationally. In contrast to a country such as Russia, or indeed to its 
earlier Maoist history, China does not expand its international media presence primarily as part of 
an “information war” with the West. Rather, as Rawnsley has argued, China has long possessed “an 
abiding faith in the ability of international broadcasting to shape the global conversation about 
China … the intangibles of public diplomacy can be converted via communication and international 
broadcasting into tangible foreign policy benefits (Rawnsley, 2015, pp. 274–275).
The strengths that it brings to such a field include the capacity for large-scale investments in 
state-of-the-art facilities and in big-budget productions, the large domestic market, the potential to 
reach the global Chinese diaspora, the ability to capture tacit knowledge and soft skills through 
collaborations and co-production agreements, a tech-savvy population with high aspirations, and 
the growing global strength of the Chinese Internet firms. Its challenges include the absence of 
arm’s length relationships to the state in terms of media and cultural content, the very different 
audience expectations of Chinese domestic audiences and international audiences, the danger of 
co-productions not appearing to be particularly “Chinese” in terms of content and themes, and the 
challenge of balancing commercial imperatives with aspirations to a greater degree of global cul-
tural influence.
The issues that arise for entertainment media and the creative industries differ from those for the 
news and information services of CCTV International. News in China is unambiguously managed by 
the state and CCTV is a state-run entity that is close to the center of governmental power. Foreigners 
are not permitted to establish alternative news services within China and while CCTV has developed 
significant international partnerships with other news services, Beijing will always retain significant 
influence over what news services are developed and the content of those news services.
Conclusion: post-globalization?
In this article, I have sought to make two key arguments. First, I have argued that while the concept 
of soft power has had a substantial influence in thinking about the cultural and communications 
dimensions of international relations, the term itself is over-extended and at risk of becoming a 
synonym for all state-led activities in the international realm that do not involve military force. 
Insofar as the concept of soft power draws upon communication and cultural studies, particularly 
in terms of how it understands cultural influence and the relationship between exposure to ideas 
and cognitive processes, it has generally worked with models derived from the mid-20th century 
mass communications theory. Little consideration is given to contemporary debates about the 
active audience or relational power that derive from cultural studies or to rethinking the transmis-
sion model of communication that once dominated the field, which has been the subject of exten-
sive critique form within communication studies since the 1970s.
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At the same time, there can be little doubt that soft power concepts have had considerable, and 
probably growing, influence upon public diplomacy initiatives in many parts of the world, with 
China being at the forefront of the take-up of soft power policy discourses. An important policy 
conclusion to be derived from the overly expansive way in which soft power is being used in con-
temporary cultural diplomacy debates and the lack of attention to key concepts such as culture and 
power is a risk distributional bias in policy measures that are based upon such soft power dis-
courses. The risk of expanding initiatives in fields such as international broadcasting and film co-
productions with little attention being given to reception contexts of cross-cultural communications 
is that nation states will be committing significant resources to these cultural initiatives to little 
tangible effect, as has arguably been occurring with the international expansion of CCTV services 
by the Chinese government over the last decade, at least in the advanced industrial nations.
The second set of conclusions relate to debates about the nation state in an era of media globali-
zation. Clearly the expansion of international broadcasting and other media services around the 
world has been enabled by the global communication technologies of cable, satellite, and the 
Internet. But the fact that nation states have been so keen to invest in such forms of media-driven 
cultural diplomacy over the last decade suggests that global media and communication studies may 
be premature in considering the nation state to be of declining influence in the world (Flew, 
Iosifidis, & Steemers, 2016). It is now generally acknowledged that media and cultural consump-
tion is strongly shaped by contexts of local and national reception as well as by the availability of 
content from around the world, so that “most people experience identity with regard to media … 
as a series of cultural geographical levels from local to global” (Straubhaar, 2014, p. 22). Similarly, 
we also need to acknowledge that nation states are active agents in shaping the global media land-
scape, both in terms of what content is made available to national citizens and in terms of seeking 
to promote their own national content in global mediascapes.
The academic literature on media globalization has often see the rise of global media networks 
and the declining power of nation states as complementary processes, particularly as the internet 
makes media content less territorially bound and as national populations become more culturally 
diverse and cosmopolitan (Beck, 2005; Castells, 2009; Howard, 2011). This is clearly complicated 
by the Chinese case, where the government is working with highly capitalized media and entertain-
ment conglomerates to develop “national champions” that are not only successful in global media 
markets, but which are using such platforms to promote media content that “reinforces the national 
discourse of Chinese identity” (Ho & Fung, 2016, p. 118) and distributes such content internation-
ally. In this respect, then, global media may look more like the world of competing hegemonic 
powers as the critical political economists have long suggested, rather than the more benign models 
presented in media globalization theories (Boyd-Barrett, 2014).
Critical political economists have always seen political, economic, and cultural powers as mutu-
ally reinforcing, with the dominant metropolitan centers dominating both the ownership of media 
industries and the global flows of media content and promoting content flows that are viewed as 
reinforcing media and cultural imperialism (Hardy, 2015). But this would lose sight of important 
counter-insights from globalization theorists, such as the significance of discontinuity and disjunc-
ture between these forms of power (Appadurai, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999), that media and cultural 
globalization is not simply a one-way flow from “the West to the rest,” and that the specificities of 
cultural power require close attention. The findings of this article, and particularly the case of the 
international expansion of Chinese media, suggest that we need to incorporate insights from both 
paradigms. The power and active agency of nation states in shaping media globalization need to be 
explicitly acknowledged, but we also need to be clear that the capacity for international distribution 
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to equate to cultural power is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. In the current con-
text, soft power discourses have been part of the ongoing process of media globalization, but they 
have also been subject to the distributional fallacy, not least because they have adopted a transmis-
sion model of global communication and a static and limited account of the relational dimensions 
of content reception and cultural power.
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